In the summer of 1912, the managers of the large cotton textile mills of Lowell, Massachusetts, had reason to be glum. That spring, the cotton workers of the city had followed the example the “Bread and Roses” strike of wool workers in neighboring Lawrence, and had struck against a pay cut by the Lowell cotton mills. Organizers from the radical Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.) union had brilliantly directed the strike. In late April, the mills had found themselves outgeneraled by the despised I.W.W. and forced to grant the greater part of the strikers’ demands. The Irish Democrat-controlled city government had proved at least neutral concerning the conflict, if not rather favorable to the strikers.\textsuperscript{1} The local press had evidenced sympathy for the strikers and bitter impatience with the control of Lowell mills by corporations headquartered in Boston.\textsuperscript{2} Lowell, the “City of Spindles,” appeared also to be the city of deep cleavages between its mill managements on one


hand and, on the other, its workers, government, and local civic leadership.

Up the Merrimack in Manchester, New Hampshire, Herman Straw could look with complacency upon the mile of textile mills he managed along the river’s banks. The great Amoskeag Manufacturing Company profitably produced miles of cotton cloth and employed fourteen thousand workers from a dozen ethnic groups without the labor unrest so common down the river. Five years before, a national magazine had proclaimed Manchester, “A City Without Strikes.” In order to keep up this tradition, Amoskeag headquarters in Boston had in 1910 authorized a series of worker welfare programs. These included specialized courses for employees, visiting nurses, and recreational activities. The ethnic groups of Manchester lived in relative harmony, and once the great 1912 strikes in Lawrence and Lowell had been won by the workers, the Amoskeag had been quick to grant its operatives similar wage hikes in order to preserve peace. Blessed with a pro-business Republican government, the city of Manchester seemed fated to continue an amicable relationship with the Amoskeag management.

On the face of it, this contrast between controversial Lowell and pacific Manchester appears strange. The two cities not only shared location in the same river valley and a common major product – cotton textiles – but they also shared a similar population mix and a very similar history. Regarding population, the two cities were not terribly disparate in size: in 1910 Manchester had a population 70,063 and Lowell one of 106,299. In common with the other textile towns of the Merrimack

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Valley, the proportion of these which fell into the native-born or native-born parents category was but a fifth or so.\textsuperscript{7} Manchester had more French Canadians than Lowell; Lowell had more Greeks than its northern sister; but in general the ethnic compositions of both cities were quite close.\textsuperscript{8}

The two cities shared a parallel history. Their industrial zones were organized by the network of businessmen in Boston who have been designated the “Boston Associates.”\textsuperscript{9} Initially using workforces largely composed of young women from Yankee farms – these “mill girls” were celebrated by the Associates as “a fund of labor, well educated and virtuous” – the two cities became famous cotton centers before 1860.\textsuperscript{10} During the century, the workforce of both Massachusetts and New Hampshire mills shifted more and more from native mill girls to entire families of immigrants, first from western Europe and Quebec, then from southern and eastern Europe. In 1912, the cotton mills, this is to say the economies, of both cities continued to be controlled from Boston.

Lowell and Manchester, however, did differ in the dates that their industrial rise began. The fifteen year hiatus between the beginnings of the Boston Associate development of the two locations (1821 in Lowell; 1836 in Manchester) had important results in the corporate structure of the cotton mill system in each place and in local


\textsuperscript{9} Vera Shlakman coined this term to describe the network of Boston investors, interrelated by business and family ties, who created the Waltham/Lowell system of mills in the first half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. See her \textit{Economic History of a Factory Town: A Study of Chicopee, Massachusetts} (New York: Octagon, 1935).

perceptions of shifts in the ethnic composition of mill workforces in each city. Different corporate structures and the arrival of social crises at different points in industrial development contributed to the tradition of animosity between mill and city in Lowell and good will between mill and city in Manchester. Beyond that, the tone of mill to city relations seems to have been echoed in levels of tension among groups within each city: Lowell’s civic life was chronically less harmonious than Manchester’s.

The histories of Lowell and Manchester up to 1912 will be reviewed, paying special attention to Boston Associate/city relations and to relations among groups within the cities. As will be seen, the tradition of harmony in Manchester benefited from not only accidents of chronology but also from enlightened paternalism on the part of Boston Associate managers on sight. Lowell suffered the ill effects of less enlightened management. The traditions of civic harmony or disharmony may well have had an impact on the fortunes of the two cities during the long decades of depression in the New England cotton industry after 1920.

Beginning in 1815, the first Boston Associates had put into operation a textile establishment pioneering in the spinning and weaving of cotton into finished cloth in the same water-powered mill along the Charles River outside of Boston. This initiative made the investors money hand-over-fist, and they looked north to the Merrimack River for textile mill sites making use of the river’s great waterpower potential.

In 1821, the rise of Lowell began with Boston Associate development of waterpower of the Pawtucket Falls. By 1834, six Boston Associate textile companies were in operation utilizing power canals drawing from the thirty-two-foot cataract. Another Boston Associate firm, the “Proprietors of the Locks and Canals Company,” sold the cotton corporations real estate and waterpower rights. Textile production, real estate, textile machinery, and water power all brought profits into the Associates’ coffers. They sought to replicate their system elsewhere within the Merrimack Valley.11

Up the Merrimack lay the great waterpower prize of the valley: the eighty-five-foot descent of water at the Amoskeag Falls and just

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beyond. The builder of the canal which circumvented the falls had prophesied that around the canal would arise the “Manchester of America.” In 1810, the citizenry to the east of the falls had christened their township by that name. By the 1820s, Rhode Island interests, including Samuel Slater, had developed several modest spinning or weaving establishments across the river from the newly-christened Manchester. In 1831, the developers of the Amoskeag site changed their business organization from a partnership to corporation, the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company (A.M.C.), in order to attract capital for a really grand utilization of local waterpower. By 1836, it had become clear that the great plans for the A.M.C. would only be realized through a reorganization by real experts in large-scale textile operations, viz. members of the Boston Associates.12

That year the Associates took over the A.M.C. and brought in the best engineers to perfect a power canal system and other experts to create the mills and the “mill girl” boarding houses required by the Lowell system. Only excellent management, however, saved the A.M.C. from crisis in the 1839-1843 depression. Investors had become loath to invest funds in totally new textile corporations in an era of falling cloth prices and overproduction. During the 1830s and 40s, the Boston Associates had brought many cotton mills onto line at a number of New England waterpower sites, and other investors had developed sites all along the Fall Line of the northeastern United States. In the new competitive situation, the A.M.C. did not replicate the experience of Lowell’s Proprietors of Locks and Canals. Instead of simply selling off mill sites and waterpower to other corporations eagerly organized to rush into textile manufacturing, the A.M.C. found itself building and managing mills itself. For all intents and purposes, the textile industry of the growing city would be concentrated in the hands of one management.13


13 Spalding, Boston Mercantile, pp. 141-161.
In Lowell, overproduction and falling prices led to the end of the “mill girl” era. In the 1830s, increased machinery speed, the “stretching out” of working hours, and a decline in wages led the “girls” at Lowell to engage in several short, futile strikes. The economic problems of the 1840s rendered conditions in the mills even more stringent. As the Yankee female operatives found textile employment less and less attractive, the Lowell corporations increasingly turned for laborers to the “Paddy Camps” of immigrant Irish across the canal from the “mill girls’” boarding houses. The shanties of the camps had been originally occupied by laborers who built the canals and mills and railroads. By the 1840s, families escaping The Famine were moving in (foreign-born Irish were to compose 27.6 percent of Lowell’s population in 1855). The penniless newcomers proved quite willing to take wages Yankee refused. Entire families entered the mills, and “by 1850 Lowell had changed from a Yankee mill village into an immigrant industrial city.”

The resident Yankee population of Lowell saw this conscious turning away from the ideal of a “well-educated and virtuous” labor force as a betrayal. By mid-century the native-born Lowell population included many merchants and professional persons not directly tied to Associate enterprises. These citizens had hoped to live in a neat, clean, truly American city fostered under the paternalistic wing of Boston investors. The utilization of the despised Irish as mill workers and the weakening of mill paternalism regarding housing and civic institutions led the Yankees to the conclusion “that the Boston Associates had sacrificed Lowell to profit.” In 1854, Lowell Yankees supported the Know-Nothing political sweep of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and elected an anti-Catholic mayor. Such explicitly bigoted politics receded quickly, but Yankee distrust of the Irish continued. Relations between Lowell civic leaders and the Boston Associates were chilled by such Associate policies as refusing to share with smaller, non-textile enterprises any of their monopoly of waterpower.


In Manchester, local reaction to Boston Associate policies was not always positive. The original Yankee residents of Manchester had been upset in 1840 when the vote of A.M.C.-connected newcomers had shifted the location of the town tall from an inland crossroads to the river’s edge near the mills. However, the tensions between newcomers and old settlers in Manchester did not echo the ethnic bitterness of Lowell. The great majority of the fast-expanding Manchester workforce remained Yankee or British Protestant through the 1850s.17

Manchester did have a nativist demonstration in 1854, and only the timely intervention of a widely respected Protestant neighbor prevented a nativist mob from doing more than breaking the windows of St. Anne’s, the Irish community’s church. An indication of a basic ethos of fairness in the community can be seen in the immediate offer of the embarrassed city government to repair the windows.18 A further indication of basic community harmony, and of a nascent antipathy to the A.M.C.’s absentee ownership, occurred the next year. In 1855, the citizens of Manchester, as a whole, stood with the city’s textile workers when they successfully struck against the corporations’ lengthening of the work day from eleven to twelve hours.19

The next year, the owners of the A.M.C. appointed Ezekial Straw to be local operation’s chief, or “agent,” of the corporation. This choice proved inspired. Straw gained the trust and goodwill of Manchester natives as he judiciously exercised the immense power of “the Amoskeag.” In contrast to the policies of Lowell’s Proprietors of Locks and Canals, Straw encouraged small industry to utilize the waterpower owned by the A.M.C. Through such wise policies, Straw managed to maintain good feelings between Manchester natives and the


textile companies for the next generation of urban and industrial development.20

The A.M.C. seems to have enjoyed a charmed life regarding its public image. The A.M.C. does not seem to have suffered from major complaints from Manchester’s citizens against the control of the company from Boston. Wise local management by Ezekial Straw played its part in this, with the Amoskeag continuing early Boston Associate practices of funding libraries, lyceums, Sunday Schools, and all sorts of civic improvements.21 The excellent Straw proved so popular in New Hampshire that its citizens voted him governor in 1872.

Control of corporations from Boston did raise the hackles of members of Lowell’s growing middle class. Lowell patent medicine “king” James C. Ayer had investments in Lowell mills, and he was shocked by their financial fragility during the 1857-1858 Panic (two of the Boston Associate corporations went bankrupt during that time). He began investigating the managements of various mills and publishing scathing reports.22 In 1859, the representative from Lowell submitted a bill to the Massachusetts House to require that corporations capitalized at over $500,000 hold their annual stockholders’ meeting in the locale in which manufacturing took place. The bill also forbade one person to serve on the directorates of more than two corporations and raised the rate of local taxation of large corporations. Boston Associate pressure on the legislature caused the bill to be voted down.23 A generation later, during Lowell’s semi-centennial celebration of 1876, Congressman Benjamin Butler would still be complaining bitterly against the absentee ownership of most of Lowell’s mills, declaring that, “Our city has been a hive of industry, and, as a rule, the honey has been gathered by others.”24

20 Ibid., p. 38; Hareven and Langenbach, Amoskeag, pp. 16-17; Hunter, Waterpower, p. 486.


23 Vernon-Wortzel, Lowell, p. 32.

The Civil War gave fuel to Lowell’s distrust of the Boston leadership of the mills. Counting on a short war, and enticed by high prices for cotton, the Treasurers of Lowell and Manchester cotton mills closed down operations in 1861 and sold off their stored bales. This selloff gave windfall profits to be spent on dividends and, especially in Lowell, much-needed renovations of aging mills. Unfortunately, the closure also put thousands of operatives out on the street.25

In 1868, Charles Cowley in his Illustrated History of Lowell, commented bitterly on the discharge of operatives in the Massachusetts:

The impartial historian cannot ignore the fact, painful as it is, that nine of the great corporations of Lowell, under a mistaken belief that they could not run their mills to a profit during the war, unanimously, in cold blood, dismissed ten thousand operatives, penniless into the streets!26

Cowley proclaims this casting off of the worker “this crime,” indeed “this worse than crime, this blunder,” since through it the cadre of “skilled operatives were dispersed, and could no more be recalled than the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel.”27 As we have seen, after the war, colorful Benjamin Butler pleased his political supporters – a coalition of Yankee farmers and Irish workers – by appealing to such memories of hurt as he battled Republican Brahmin industrialists of Boston who controlled the Lowell mills.28


27 Ibid.

Such a legacy of bitterness does not seem to have survived from the shutdown of the A.M.C. cotton operations during the war. Perhaps this is because the A.M.C. moved quickly to different types of war production: its machine shops, for instance, turned out thousands of weapons, including 25,000 Springfield rifles.\textsuperscript{29} In any case, in both cities many of the male operatives marched off to join the Union ranks, while many of the Yankee female operatives returned to family farms. After a period of privation, unemployed men and women eventually found work at the two cities’ machine shops and woolen mills booming from war orders.

The dislocations of the Civil War occurred during the period in which the Amoskeag mills were enlisting more and more immigrant labor. It may well be that the intensely negative reaction of the Yankee population to this change of personnel which had occurred in Lowell was short-circuited in the case of Manchester because of the break in cotton manufacturing caused by the war. When peace returned, the enlistment of foreign-born workers became merely one more of a series of changes in a fast-moving social landscape.\textsuperscript{30}

In any case, it was true that postwar Merrimack manufactures looked to foreign workers to meet their labor needs. In particular, recruiters were sent to Quebec to tap the labor pool waiting in that economically-depressed province. First by wagon, then by shining new railroad tracks, thousands of \textit{habitants} traveled south to work in the mills. An agricultural people used to hard working conditions, and untouched as yet by traditions of labor militancy, families of these French-speaking immigrants kept the Merrimack mills going through the hard times of the 1870s. Their presence in the Merrimack Valley became formidable by 1880. “Franco-Americans” provided one-fifth of Manchester’s population of 32,600 that year, and one sixth Lowell’s population 59,000.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{29} Browne, \textit{Amoskeag Manufacturing Company}, p. 81.

\textsuperscript{30} The short analysis of this topic in Hanlan’s study would support this interpretation. Hanlan, \textit{Working Population}, pp. 119-120. In 1860, the foreign-born composed only 10.8 percent of the working population of Manchester; in 1870 they formed 25.7 percent of the workforce. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 82.

The political interests of Lowell labor, native-born and foreign-born, were championed by Benjamin Butler, who dismayed Republican industrialists by managing to obtain the rank of Governor of the Commonwealth in 1882. However, butler’s efforts on behalf of an eight-hour day came to naught. Up the river in New Hampshire, a rock-ribbed Republican hegemony catered to the interests of textile mill owners. For Lowell and Manchester workers, effective legislation against child labor and reducing working hours would have to wait until the next century.

Job actions by Lowell textiles workers fared poorly during the nineteenth century. Relying on their monopoly on special skills, “mule spinners” went out on strike in 1867 and in 1875 and failed in both efforts. Mill owners of that city began to utilize improved ring-spinning machines, simple enough to be run by green labor from Canada, yet able to spin the finer yarns once the monopoly of mule-spinning machines and their skilled operatives. The easily replaced textile workers in Lowell did not join in the lively labor agitation that characterized the rising shoe industry of Merrimack Valley. Fear of unemployment during the economic depression of the 1890s helped keep labor unrest at a minimum in Lowell until the dawn of the new century.

Up in Manchester, Ezekial Straw had laid down the mantle of local manager of the Amoskeag in 1879. The A.M.C.’s paternalistic policies had weakened in the years after the Civil War, years in which new working populations had entered mills. Apparently, the tradition of labor peace at the Amoskeag also weakened in the years after the venerable manager’s departure, for the Knights of Labor began to


organize the mill workers. In 1885, Herman Straw took on the position of manager, but within a year a majority of Amoskeag operatives were on strike. The strike failed in its immediate objective to raise wages, but the sight of workers of all backgrounds staying out of the mills for several weeks expedited a rejuvenated policy of paternalism at the Amoskeag works. After 1886, Herman proved to have the winning ways of his father with all constituencies in Manchester. Careful attention to relations with all groups of workers and with the civic leaders of Manchester would come into full flower with the extensive company welfare programs of the second decade of the 20th century.

As was noted at the beginning of this article, such an ironic attitude on the part of labor was not to be found in Lowell as the new century began. Middle class irritation with the old Lowell textile firms continued as five of the textile corporations faced financial crises between 1898 and the great 1912 strike.

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36 The lack of record of strikes of any significance at the huge Amoskeag works after 1855 is a tribute to Straw’s cultivation of good relations with operatives, but it also may well be a tribute to his craftiness. The mule spinners’ strike of 1867, in which they were joined by many other workers, spread to all centers of the New England cotton industry. At its appearance at the Amoskeag, Straw simply closed the mills. Probably the Amoskeag had plenty of manufactured inventory on hand. Vernon-Wortzel, Lowell, pp. 174-175, and 178.
